Constitutional Law—Impairment of Obligation of Contract—Impairment by Change of Remedies—Impairment by Excercise of State\u27s Police Power.— Canal Nat\u27l Bank v. School Administrative Dist. No. 3. by Kotarba, Richard G
Boston College Law Review
Volume 6 | Issue 3 Article 22
4-1-1965
Constitutional Law—Impairment of Obligation of
Contract—Impairment by Change of
Remedies—Impairment by Excercise of State's
Police Power.— Canal Nat'l Bank v. School
Administrative Dist. No. 3.
Richard G. Kotarba
Follow this and additional works at: http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr
Part of the Contracts Commons
This Casenotes is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. It has been accepted
for inclusion in Boston College Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. For more information,
please contact nick.szydlowski@bc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Richard G. Kotarba, Constitutional Law—Impairment of Obligation of Contract—Impairment by
Change of Remedies—Impairment by Excercise of State's Police Power.— Canal Nat'l Bank v. School
Administrative Dist. No. 3., 6 B.C.L. Rev. 609 (1965), http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr/vol6/
iss3/22
CASE NOTES
parties, unless some other state has a more significant relation-
ship with the occurrence and the parties as to the particular
issue involved, in which event the local law of the latter state
will govern."
In the instant case, Pennsylvania was interested to the extent that the
decedent was a Pennsylvania domiciliary, the airplane ticket was purchased in
Pennsylvania, and the flight began and was eventually to end in Pennsylvania.
Also because the decedent's family lived in Pennsylvania, compensation for
their loss will have an effect on Pennsylvania. Colorado, on the other hand,
where the death occurred, had no other relationship to either the decedent
or the defendant airline. This decision thus aligns Pennsylvania with the
rapidly growing number of jurisdictions which apply the newer rule based
on "contacts," "center of gravity" or "significant relationships" to their
choice of law problems in conflict of laws.
This newer rule of "contacts," although arguably a cause of "forum
shopping" in which a plaintiff could attempt to sue in that jurisdiction in
which he will receive the largest recovery, merely authorizes the forum
state to apply its own law in a choice of law situation when it has a significant
relationship or interest in the outcome of the action. In the instant case, a
more equitable result was attained using the newer "contacts" rule than
would have been attained if the place of injury rule had been applied by the
Pennsylvania court.
FRANCIS FRASIER
Constitutional Law—Impairment of Obligation of Contract—Impair-
ment by Change of Remedies--Impairment by Exercise of State's Police
Power.—Canal Nat'l Bank v. School Administrative Dist. No. 3 ?—
The Canal National Bank was the holder of bonds issued by a school admin-
istrative district (SAD) which was comprised of eleven Maine towns. Under
existing statutes,2 the bonds were secured by (I) the power of the SAD
to tax the eleven towns and (2) the right of the bank to levy on all
personalty of the residents and on all realty within the eleven-town district.
Subsequent to the issuance of the bonds, the state legislature enacted a
statute, 8 removing three of the eleven towns from the SAD and reorganizing
the SAD to comprise the eight remaining towns. Under this statute, the
bonds were to be secured by (1) the power of the SAD to tax the remaining
eight towns, (2) the right of the bank to levy directly on the property of
the eight towns, and (3) a contingent liability imposed on the three with-
drawn towns if payment in full was not made by levy on all the assets of the
reorganized SAD. The bank brought suit for a declaratory judgment. The
lower court rendered a decision in favor of the bank; and on appeal to the
85
 Id. § 379a.
1
 203 A.2d 734 (Me. 1964).
2 Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. ch. 41, § 111-K to L; ch. 90A, § 23; ch. 118, § 32 (Supp.
1963) ; Me. Rev. Stat. Ann, ch. 118, § 30-1.
3 Me. Priv. Sr Sp. Laws 1963, ch. 175.
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state supreme court, HELD: The reorganizing statute is unconstitutional
under both the state4 and federala constitutions in that it impairs the con-
tractual obligations of the bonds.
The court reasoned that although the legislature may change the reme-
dies for the enforcement of contractual obligations, the remedies substituted
or retained must be the substantial equivalent of the remedies lost. The
court then found that the contingent liability of the three withdrawn towns
was not the substantial equivalent of the SAD's power to tax the three
towns and the bank's non-contingent right to levy on the property of the
three towns. The court further stated that the fact that the statute was
enacted for educational purposes did not remove the constitutional bar to
its validity.
It is submitted that the court erred in its adoption of the "substantial
equivalent" standard in determining whether the reorganization statute
impaired the contractual obligations of the bonds. The standard is based
solely on a passage found in the case of Mobile v. Watson . 6 The decisive
factor of the Mobile case was that the questioned statute "made no adequate
provision for the payment" 7 of the municipal bonds. Thus the passage which
forms the basis for this standard appears to be mere dicta. In addition, the
case was decided in 1886. It is significant that prior to this date—despite
cases to the effect that the legislature had the power to change remedies°—
the only change uniformly held constitutional was the abolishment of im-
prisonment for debt.° At this date, then, the Court had not yet left the
period in which remedy changes were not readily sanctioned. Finally, and
most significantly, the "substantial equivalent" standard is not in accord
with the two standards which have been generally accepted in the most recent
cases, and which may be broadly termed as the "efficacy" and "value of the
contract" standards."
4 Me. Const, art. I, § 11.
5 U.S. Const. art. I, § 10.
a 116 U.S. 289 (1886). The Court stated that the remedies for the enforcement of
contractual obligations, "which existed when the contract was made, must be left un-
impaired by the legislature, or, if they are changed, a substantial equivalent must be
provided." Mobile v. Watson, supra at 305.
T Id. at 299.
8 Mason v. Haile, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 234 (1827) ; Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S.
(12 Wheat.) 135 (1827); Sturges v. Crowinshield, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 70 (1819).
The first and leading case on the power of the legislature to change remedies is
Sturges v. Crowinshield, supra. In that case, at the time defendant incurred a debt to
the plaintiff, the state law provided that debts could be discharged only by full pay-
ment. Subsequently, the state enacted an insolvency law which abolished imprisonment
for debt and discharged the debtor from his obligation to pay on the debtor's surrender-
ing his property to a trustee. In upholding the law insofar as it abolished imprisonment
for debt, Mr. Chief Justice Marshall stated:
The distinction between the obligation of a contract, and the remedy given by
the legislature to enforce that obligation, has been taken at the bar, and exists
in the nature of things. Without impairing the obligation of the contract, the
remedy may certainly be modified as the wisdom of the nation shall direct.
Sturges v. Crowinshield, supra at 106.
Penniman's Case, 103 U.S. 714 (1881) ; Mason v. Haile, supra note 8; Sturges
v. Crowinshield, supra note 8.
10 The distinction between these standards is, at best, tenuous. In the first place,
610
CASE NOTES
The "efficacy" standard, prevalent in state decisions since 1925,11
resembles the "substantial equivalent" standard in that it initially distin-
guishes the remedy to enforce the contractual obligation from the con-
tractual obligation itself. It similarly recognizes that the former may be
changed without impairing the latter. Unlike the "substantial equivalent"
standard, however, in determining whether the legislative change has re-
sulted in impairment of the contractual obligation, the "efficacy" standard
does not look solely to whether there has been a substantial reduction in
the remedies, but rather considers the remedy in relation to the obligation
to be enforced. Thus the obligation is not impaired if there is merely a
substantial reduction in remedies, but only if the remaining remedy is found
not to be "reasonabIe," 12
 "substantial and efficacious,"" "reasonably ade-
quate and effective,"" or "sufficient" 15 for enforcement of the obligation.
The "value of the contract" standard, adopted in the dicta of many
cases" from the time of Planters' Bank v. Sharp" in 1848, is strongly
supported by the leading case of Faitoute Iron & Steel Co. v. City of Asbury
Park." In the latter case, subsequent to the issuance of its bonds, the city
approached insolvency. The bonds had little value, and the purchasers' sole
remedy for enforcement of the bonds—a suit for mandamus to compel the
levying of additional taxes—was equally valueless. The statute in question
provided that the original bonds could only be converted into new bonds
bearing a lower rate of interest. At the time of refunding, the new bonds
the two standards may be substantially the same insofar as the "efficacy" standard is
geared toward the protection of the value of the contract. Secondly, several cases draw
no distinction, and indiscriminately use language referring to a change of remedies and
to the value of the contract. See, e.g., Penniman's Case, supra note 9. As will be seen,
"remedies" language has no place in a decision based on the "value of the contract"
standard.
11
 The origin of the standard may be Oshkosh Waterworks Co. v. Oshkosh, 187
U.S. 437 (1903), where Mr. Justice Harlan stated:
[It] is equally well settled that the Legislature may modify or change existing
remedies or prescribe new modes of procedure, without impairing the obligation
of contracts, provided a substantial or efficacious remedy remains or is given,
by means of which a party can enforce his rights under the contract.
Oshkosh Waterworks Co. v. Oshkosh, supra at 439.
12 Creteau v. Phoenix Assur. Co. of N.Y., 202 Va. 641, 119 S.E.2d 336 (1961)
(insurance contract).
23 Dows Estates v. Smith, 290 N.Y. 484, 49 N.E.2d 977 (1943) (mortgage con-
tract); Onsrud v. Kenyon, 238 Wis. 496, 300 N.W. 359 (1941) (mortgage contract).
24
 Burke v. Fidelity Trust Co., 202 Md. 178, 96 A.2d 254 (1953) (bank charter
contract).
15
 Mahood v. Bessemer Properties, 154 Fla. 710, 18 So. 2d 775 (1944) (purchase
and sale agreement of realty) ; Lowther v. People's Bank, 293 Ky. 425, 169 S.W.2d 35
(1943) (real estate broker contract).
15
 Richmond Mortgage & Loan Corp. v. Wachovia Bank and Trust Co., 300
U.S. 124 (1937) ("remedies" language also) ; Worthen Co. v. Kavanaugh, 295 U.S. 56
(1935) (by implication); Home Bldg. & Loan Assn. v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934)
("remedies" language also); Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922);
Penniman's Case, supra note 9 ("remedies" language also).
17 47 U.S. (6 How.) 317 (1848). The Court stated that one "of the tests that a
contract has been impaired is, that its value has by legislation been diminished."
Planters' Bank v. Sharp, supra at 344.
15
 316 U.S. 502 (1942) (no dissent).
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were selling at 69, and at the time of the suit, they commanded a market
price of better than 90. In speaking of the dividing line between a legitimate
change in remedies and a change which, under the form of modifying the
remedy, impairs the obligations of a contract, Mr. Justice Frankfurter said
that the line would remain "obscure if we deal with empty abstract rights
instead of worldly gains and losses, if we indulge in doctrinaire talk about
`rights' and 'remedies.' " 19 Mr. Justice Frankfurter then pointed out that
"that which was a most depreciated claim of little value has, by the very
scheme complained of, been saved and transmuted into substantial value." 20
In upholding the statute, then, the Faitoute decision effectively (1) abolishes
the distinction between remedy and obligation 21 and (2) makes the standard
for determination of impairment the question of whether the value of the
contract immediately before enactment of the questioned statute is diminished
after its enactment. 22 Thus the "substantial equivalent" standard stands in
marked contrast with the "value of the contract" standard on both points,
particularly on the latter.
It is further submitted that the Canal Nat'l Bank court might have
easily disposed of the case on the ground that the statute was a valid
exercise of the state's police power.
That a state may, in the exercise of its police power, enact a statute which
impairs contractual obligations is now clear. 25 It is further clear that to
qualify as a valid exercise of the police power, the statute must be addressed
to a legitimate end, 24 i.e., a purpose which is within the scope of the police
power, and the measures taken must be reasonable and appropriate to that
end.25
12 Id. at 515.
20
 Id. at 515-16.
21 Accord, Judge Learned Hand's statement that "a right without any remedy is
a meaningless scholasticism." Wood & Selick v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique,
43 F.2d 941, 943 (2d Cir. 1930).
22 Before Faitoute v. City of Asbury was decided, the "value of the contract"
standard required protection of the value at the time the contract was made, rather
than the value at the time the statute was enacted. People ex rel. Brixton Operating
Corp. v. La Fetra, 194 App. Div. 523, 186 N.Y.& 58 (1920). See Worthen Co. v.
Kavanaugh, supra note 16.
23 Veix v. Sixth Ward Bldg. & Loan Assn. of Newark, 310 U.S. 32 (1940) ; Home
Bldg. & Loan Assn. v. Blaisdell, supra note 16.
24 Compare Veix v. Sixth Ward, supra note 23, with Treigle v. Acme Homestead
Assn., 297 U.S. 189 (1936).
The following constitute some of the ends for which the police power may be
validly exercised under the contracts-impairment clause: health, City of Covington v.
Sanitation Dist. No. 1 of Campbell and Kenton Counties, 301 S.W.2d 885 (Ky. 1957);
safety, New York State Thruway Authority v. Ashley Motor Court, Inc., 12 App. Div.
2d 223, 210 N.Y.S.2d 193 (1961); economic interests, Willys Motors v. Northwest
Kaiser-Willys, 142 F. Supp. 469 (D. Minn. 1956); and conservation of cemeteries,
Grove Hill Realty Co. v. Ferncliff Cemetery Assn., 7 N.Y.2d 403, 198 N.Y.S.2d 287, 165
N.E.2d 858 (1960).
25 These were the requirements first set down in the body of the leading case
Home Bldg. & Loan Assn. v. Blaisdell, supra note 16. However, in its conclusion, the
Court added the requirements that an emergency situation exist and that the legisla-
tion be temporary. These latter requirements were later erased by Veix v. Sixth Ward,
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The sole obstacle" in upholding the reorganization statute is that no
precedent has been established to the effect that education is an end for
which the police power may be exercised where the contracts-impairment
clause is concerned, However, this obstacle might be easily overcome. In
Interstate Consol. St. Ry. v. Commonwealth of Mass." an educationally
oriented statute was challenged as violative of due process. In upholding the
statute against the due process objection, Chief Justice Holmes stated:
"Education is one of the purposes for which what is called the police power
may be exercised."28
 It has been strongly suggested that the standard
utilized to determine the validity of an exercise of the police power is the
same under both the due process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments and the contracts-impairment clause." The suggestion is highly
logical, since to require a more stringent standard under the contracts-
impairment clause than under the due process clause would be to prefer
contract rights to personal and property rights. Also, the cases which deal
with the police power under the contracts-impairment clause intimate no
distinction as to the extent of the validity of the police power under the
two clauses." From these facts, therefore, there arises a strong inference
that an educationally oriented statute can be upheld against a contracts-
impairment objection as a valid exercise of the police power.
The practical consequences of this decision, too, must not be forgotten.
In adopting the "substantial equivalent" standard, the Canal Nat'l Bank
court effectively renders the contracts-impairment clause absolute, thus ob-
structing the flow of that capital which need not be tied up in giving
excessive security to contract obligations. This is economically unsound. In
failing to include education within the scope of the police power, and con-
sequently to uphold the educationally oriented statute against a contracts-
impairment objection, the court unnecessarily precludes any means of im-
proving the educational system which would involve alteration of existing
contracts. The academic determination, then, that the court is a step or two
behind present case law and present trends constitutes merely one major
criticism of the Canal Nat'l Bank decision. A second, and equally severe
criticism is based on the observation that the practical effect of the decision
is to deny economic and social benefits which are constitutionally obtainable.
RICHARD G. KOTARBA
supra note 23, where the Court upheld a statute which was permanent in nature and
which was enacted to meet no emergency situation.
28
 There is a presumption in favor of the legislature regarding the reasonableness
and appropriateness of the measures. Grove Hill Realty Co. v. Ferncliff Cemetery Assn.,
supra note 24. See Veix v. Sixth Ward, supra note 23, where the Court seems to set only
one requirement—namely, that the legislation be addressed to a legitimate end.
27 207 U.S. 79 (1907).
28 Id. at 87.
29
 Hochman, The Supreme Court and the Constitutionality of Retroactive Legis-
lation, 73 Harv. L. Rev. 692, 695 (1960), citing several cases to support conclusion.
39 See cases cited supra note 24.
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